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 1 
Introduction 
There has been increasing concern that the statistical estimates of the mean 
 willingness to pay (WTP) for public goods may be biased as the statistical method or survey 
mechanism (as in Contingent Valuation Method, henceforth, CVM) may fail to consider the 
effects of substitute programs.  Economic theory posits that when two or more items are 
competing for the same limited resource,  an increase in expenditure on one, ceteris paribus, 
reduces spending on the other.  So the WTP for a specific program or good depends on what 
substitutes or complements exist and are considered for that good. Any valuation program that 
neglects the presence/availability of budgetary substitutes and complements leads to a biased 
valuation of the public good in question. 
The purpose of this paper is to present an outline of the substitution and sequencing test 
and provide results of a test involving voluntary checkoffs to see how the agenda presented to the 
respondents affect the valuation for one good, particularly, the nongame wildlife and endangered 
species fund.  The success of nongame wildlife checkoff programs that emphasize saving non-
game wildlife and endangered species  allowed the rapid development of other competing 
programs in most states.  On the 1996 tax returns to be processed in 1997, a survey conducted by 
Federation of Tax Administrators identified 163 check-off programs available to taxpayers in 41 
states and the District of Columbia (In 1994, there was a total of 156 programs).   This study 
uses aggregate data on checkoffs to examine donation behavior of the respondents. In the field of 
experimental economics, a !valid  experiment requires two things: one, the clarity of payment 
mechanism and second, the provision rule, that is, what does the respondent get for the money he 
or she donates?  In our experiment, both the rules are satisfied.  The mode of payment is dollars 
and the end product of such a contribution is a change in the quantity of the good in question.  So 






Testing for Substitution Effects 
Empirical Model, Estimation and Results 
Our first task is to use an empirical model in a form that allows for statistical analysis. 
Empirical testing for the presence of substitution effects would be carried out with the use of a 
theoretically consistent functional form.  The compensating variation function, similar to a 
production function is continuous, is concave and allows for the presence of substitution or 
complementarity effects. The compensating variation (CV) of a move from one situation to 
another is defined as the amount of money a contributor gives up in the new situation in order to 
stay as well off as before.  So, we derive the benefit measure using the consumer expenditure 
function.  Theoretically, the expenditure function (for q bundle of goods at prices p, and utility 
level u) takes the following form: 
min ￿ pi qi subject to u( q1,.....q n)  =  u     (1.1) 
The first order conditions to this problem are solved for the choice variables q i in terms of the  
exogenous variables p and u or,  
qi = qi (p,u)      (1.2) 
These represent the compensated demand functions for the good q i and the expenditure function  
is derived as follows;   
e(p, u) =  ￿ pi qi(p, u)      (1.3) 
Employing Hotelling s Lemma, we get the compensated demand functions by taking the derivative 
of the expenditure function with respect to prices: 
0e( p, u)/ 0pi = qi (p, u)          i = 1,....., n        (1.4) 
Thus, CV is written as  CV = m
1 - e(p
1, u0)      (1.5) 
 We have modified the Cummings et al. (1994) model to accommodate our data.  We 




children (c) and seniors (s)
1.  These are the most common funds in state income tax check-offs. 







  Here, Y is the reported average voluntary contribution to all programs summed together 
and X represents average (non-zero) contributions per contributor to the specific fund categories. 
 M stands for personal median income of the state and T represents average state income tax 
receipts for each state for the fiscal year under consideration.  The residuals are captured in the 
error term, e, which is assumed to be normally distributed.  The reason behind the use of !per 
contributor  data instead of !per taxpayer  is the very low participation rates in the check-off 
programs.  Many states limit the size of donations to the size of the refund, while some states 
permit taxpayers to increase their payments to cover check-off donations (cited in FTA 
Newsletter, March 1997).  Hence, we use a dummy variable to capture this effect where the 
                                                             
1Note that these programs are broad categories which is inclusive of all related programs, e.g., 
$sports# includes programs related to Olympics, bluegrass games, etc. and $seniors#                 
includes both seniors and veterans programs.  
(1.6)    
e   +   effects)    status (Tax   T X   +  
effects)   (income   M X   +  
effects)   n interactio - (program   X X   +  
effect)   (refund   X   +  




















dummy variable takes the value one, if the income tax form includes an option for individuals not 
receiving a refund to contribute to the check-off programs, and 0, otherwise.   
To check for the existence of substitution effects between the different programs, we use 
real contributions as opposed to the binary variables used in Cummings, et al.  Substitution effects 
between the check-off programs are defined here in terms of how the presence or inclusion of a 
program affects the marginal valuation of the other programs.  The second order or cross product 
terms from the substitution matrix H has both same program and cross program effects.  These 
second order program effects represent terms in the matrix of the form  0
2s/ 0pi 0pj as they 
represent the effect of a change in valuation for program j on the marginal valuation of  program i. 
 If pi  and pj  are substitutes, then this term will have a negative sign, if they are complements, the 
sign will be positive and if the programs are viewed as independent by the respondents, then the 
term will be zero.  The results of our estimation are listed in table 1.1. The estimated coefficients 
under varied parameter restrictions are presented in each of the three columns. The estimated 
mean donation levels by the contributors for each program for the entire data set of 30 states from 
1984-1994 along with their standard errors is also reported in the table.
2       
Comparing the coefficient estimates across the models, we notice that the estimates are 
stable.  In the first model, we notice that the single program terms are significant.  The 
performance of the model is indicated by their respective adjusted R-squares.  Most of the 
program interaction terms suggest that the programs are substitutes.  The effect of option of 
contribution only from refunds is also significant.  This implies that the average (non-zero) 
contributions to wildlife are significantly increased in those states that allowed all taxpayers to 
contribute to the fund.  So, if policy makers are interested in increasing funds received from the 
                                                             
2Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 




wildlife fund, states that allow payments to be made only from refunds should change this clause. 
Notice also that the tax receipts for each state have a positive and significant influence on 
contributions in all models while individual income has a negative and significant influence on 
contributions.  This is a somewhat surprising result that indicates check-offs as a regressive source 
of revenue. This same conclusion is also reached by Revier and Harpman in 1992.  However, in 
all the models, the marginal impact of both median income and tax receipts is extremely low.  For 
the full model, the program-income interaction terms and the program-tax interaction are also 
significant.   
   We also tested for the independence of the different programs by using a Wald test which 
rejected the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance implying that the programs are not 
independent.  This implies the respondent s valuation for a particular program is affected by the 
inclusion of other programs in the agenda.  To investigate this issue further, we checked whether 
differences in mean donations exists with changes in the number of programs in the scheme. 
Results are reported in table 1.2. As the table indicates, the total average (non-zero) contributions 
decline by greater magnitude as the number of categories increases. So, our conclusion is that the 
contributors view very disparate public goods as either substitutes or complements. 
 
Sequencing Effects- How Do They Affect Valuation? 
Question-order Effects 
Current literature on CVM studies places importance on sequencing effects.  Sequencing 
occurs when several projects are evaluated in a sequential manner, and the willingness to pay for 
items shown later in the sequence keeps declining.  This implies that respondent s assessment for 
values are interdependent, when they actually should be independent.  When respondents have a 
fixed budget that they allocate for donations, then they perceive a wealth effect (Samples and 
Hollyer, 1990).  Respondents tend to donate generously to the category that they first value, and 




order bias.  
A formulation of the problem of valuation under sequencing effects is presented next.   
Consider an individual with the utility function;  
 U = U(x1, x2, x, Q, y)                          (2.1) 
where x is the bundle of goods to be valued, Q is the current policy agenda and y is the vector of 
private goods and services. The subscripts denote goods valued in the sequence. 
The solution to the problem is; 
  min (p1x1+ p2x2 + py ) subject to U(.) ￿ U
0   (2.2) 
Assuming prices for private goods and services to be exogenous, the expenditure function takes 
the form;   
e = e(p1, p2, Q,U
0)           ( 2 . 3 )    
So, the Hicksian compensating surplus measure would be equivalent to: 


























due to the effect of question order bias. 
Carson and Mitchell(1993) agree that sequencing matters and that people place 
less value on a particular good when it is placed down in a WTP sequence, but the opposite holds 
for WTA sequence.  Kahnemann and Knetsch (1992) note that one problem in working with the  
top-down allocation framework is ambiguity as conditions under which the goods are provided 
are not well specified and it is up to the respondents to make different assumptions about these 
conditions.  In our check-off model, the wildlife fund and the childrens  fund are the most 
common funds among states.  Among the thirty states that we use, all the states have wildlife fund 
and twenty-eight of them have children fund too.  Hence, we examine these two funds for the year 
1994 to check for the presence of sequencing effects.
3   
                                                             




Model Specification and Testing 
To examine the effects of asking respondents to respond to a number of sequential 
questions in a single tax form, we created two separate equations for average (non-zero) 
contributions to the wildlife and the childrens  funds separately.  A simple ordinary least square 
regression model was run to capture the sequencing effect by the use of a dummy variable.  The 
equations are represented as follows: 
:$9*   ￿0 ￿￿1 ’80￿ ￿ ￿2 180%(5 ￿ ￿3$9* ￿ ￿4INC (2.4) 
&$9*   ￿0 ￿￿1 ’80￿ ￿ ￿2 180%(5 ￿ ￿3$9* ￿ ￿4INC (2.5) 
WAVG and CAVG are the average (non-zero) contributions per contributor for the 
wildlife and the childrens  fund in the year 1994.  DUM1 is a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1, when wildlife is placed first in the sequence and 0, otherwise.  Similarly, DUM2 is the 
binary variable, taking the value 1 when children fund immediately follows the wildlife fund and 0, 
otherwise.  NUMBER represents the number of categories in the sequence of funds to be valued, 
AVG is the total average (non-zero) contributions per contributor to all funds summed together 
and INC is the median income of the state for that year.  Since we are limited by the unavailability 
of individual data on income, we use the median income of the state as a proxy for the average 
income of the contributor.  The results of our regression are expressed in table 2.1.  The t-
statistics are expressed in the parentheses. 
The above regression confirms the existence of a sequencing effect as both the dummy 
variables are significant and positive at 5 % level of significance with a magnitude of $1.75 and 
$2.43 respectively.  Number of categories as well as total average (non-zero) contributions have a 
positive and significant influence on average (non-zero) contributions.  Notice that median income 
has a significant and positive influence on average (non-zero) contributions for wildlife but it 
ceases to be significant for the childrens  fund.  
Now, using the terminology developed by Samples and Hollyer (1990), let the value for 




(W￿C) and similarly, the value of children, in the presence of wildlife is represented as WTP 
(C￿W).  Now, if respondents perceive wildlife and children to be substitutes, then WTP (W￿0)
4 > 
WTP (W￿C) because the value of a good is greater in the absence of its substitutes.  In our 
dataset, the above is found true as the mean WTP(W| 0) averaged over 9 states is $9.14, while 
WTP(W|C) averaged over 22 states is $7.74. 
                                                             
4WTP(W￿0) implies value of W in the absence of C. 
Next, we carried out a test wherein we seek to check if value attained for W is higher if it 
is placed first in the sequence than if it is placed lower, i.e., if WTP(W1)>WTP(W2) or not.  A 
similar exercise is also carried out for childrens  program when children is placed second in the 
sequence than when it is placed lower.  The results of this exercise are summarized in table 2.2. 
We notice the WTP for both the programs varied depending upon their placement in the check-off 
sequence. 
Results of the Sequencing Test 
Our exercise confirms that the sequencing effects exist in the check-off donations and 
therefore, values elicited under different sequential setting differ.   This leads us to believe that 
problems encountered in a CVM questionnaire that inhibit researchers  ability to get !valid  
estimates also exist in the checkoff mechanism.  Perhaps, this occurs due to the differences 
respondents perceive in the choice set made available to them by believing that the programs are 
ranked according to their relative importance.   
People may have a relatively inflexible budget that they allocate for donation purposes and 




subsequent programs.  Hence, the possible inability of respondents to be !insensitive  to the 
sequence of questions is an issue that suggests a possible avenue for further research. 
 
Summary of the Estimation Results 
Overall, our study supports the importance of agenda effects in influencing the 
level of payments for environmental improvements.  As in CVM, voluntary donations also depend 
upon the order of options and the presence of substitute options.  Hence, donations as a welfare 
measure needs to be examined more critically.  Therefore, the reliability of this mechanism in 
interpreting these statistics as donation levels or willingness-to-pay in some narrow sense needs 

































0.48* * * 
(0.018) 
 
0.47* * * 
(0.013) 
 

























Games and Sports (G) 
 






















0.003* * * 
(0.001) 
 

































































































































































































































































a Standard errors in parentheses;  
* * * implies significance at 1% level 
* * implies significance at 5 % level 
* implies significance at 10% level   
bMean values of variables where number of observations equal 313: W = 5.48; C = 2.12; S = 0.90; 
G = 0.90; E = 0.57; I = 33,976; T = 457. 
 
 
Table 1.2 : Magnitude of the Agenda Problem  
 





























































(Number of Observations: 28) 
 
Equation 1 (Dependent 
variable - WAVG) 
Adj. R-square          0.88 
F- value                 62.38 
 
Equation 2 (Dependent 
variable - CAVG) 
Adj. R-square         0.49 
















0.33  (4.48) 
 




0.90  (11.24) 
 




5.36  (1.40) 
 
-7.20  (-0.56) 















Total of 30 states where W is 
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